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day when one of these lawyers is frantically searching through his
Canadian Criminal Evidence to see if he can find a case on point
some wise and honest judge will lean over and exclaim: "who
cares!" He will then decide the fate of the offered proof by
making a simple judgment based on the few principles that
underlie any rational adjudicative process and that are often
obscured in these books beneath a myriad of cases.
NEIL BROOKs*
Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury andDeath. By HAROLD
LUNTZ. Sydney : Butterworth Pty Ltd. 1974 . Pp. xxxii, 350.
(No Price Given)
This is an outstanding book : it is certainly one of the best mono-
graghs on any branch of the law of tort that has appeared in the
common law world in the last thirty years. This must have been
a particularly difficult book for the author to write for not only
is the subject he has chosen to write about an intrinsically com-
plicated one but the author feels that the whole system of common
law damages should be jettisoned in favour of periodic benefits
paid on a no-fault basis. Indeed, one gets the impression that Mr.
Luntz would be very happy if there were no need for successive
editions of his book .
If there is an aspect of the law of damages which has not
been extensively and acutely discussed, I have not been able to
find it . Whether he is dealing with the rule in Brunsden v.
Humphrey,' the rule in B.T.C . v. Gourley,2 the collateral source
rule, actuarial methods of computing damages and many other
topics, the author is always clear, exhaustive and forceful .
All this does not mean that I would agree with all of Mr.
Luntz's recommendations. Thus, in a "no-fault world", Mr. Luntz
would abolish the private action for damages for assault and
battery but the reasons he gives for this recommendation are not
convincing. He argues that punitive damages do not make sense
in a world of liability insurance . This is true, but presumably, in a
no-fault regime liability insurance will be a thing of the past.
Alternatively, even with liability insurance, there is no reason why
* Neil Brooks, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto .
1 (1884), 14 Q.B.D . 141 .
2 [1956] A.C . 185 .
1976]
3 Ibid .
4 (1874), L.R . 10 Ex . 1 . ,
5 My emphasis .
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the insurance should be held to cover awards of exemplary or
punitive damages. Finally, there is no need to fear that the wrong-
doer will be punished twice. It should be possible within a single
proceeding to make sure that the wrongdoer only pays one penalty
and it should be possible to divide that penalty between the victim
and the State .
Although the question is a very difficult one, I am unable to
share Mr. Luntz's support of B.T.C . v. Gourley.3 Insurers do not
pay tax on the sums they retain under Gourley. This seems
particularly difficult to justify when the law (certainly in Canada
and the United Kingdom) already gives very generous tax treat-
ment to insurers . It is hard to justify this amount of generosity,
unless one can be fairly certain that premium rates would be
significantly lowered. There is another aspect to the problem: at
present awards for damages do not take inflation into account.
If the plaintiff in Gourley had had £.37,720 (instead of L6,695)
to invest, this would have given greater protection against the
ravages of inflation. Mr. 1-untz would argue that the way to deal
with the inflation problem is for the courts to expressly take this
into account in assessing damages. This idea obviously has merit
but until that change is accomplished, I would favour the pre-
Gourley law.
I would also-given the present fault regime-not tamper
with the collateral benefits principle which the author would like
to have totally removed from the law, even to the extent of
deducting (at least some) charitable gifts from the victim's
damages. The author delivers a devastating broadside at Bradburn
v. G.W. Railway.4 Although it is true that the reason given by the
court in Bradburn in support of the rule, namely, that the insured
had paid his premiums, is weak, I would not make the parallel
which the author makes between property and personal injury
insurance. In the former case, even with the revenue-producing
property, there is not usually present the problem of measuring
continuing5 loss which arises in all cases of serious personal injury.
Again my fear is that with the refusal on the part of the courts
to take into account inflation and given also their reluctance to
use actuarial tables, that the level of dam-ages will be inadequate
to compensate victims even for their economic losses during the
period of their disability . I should add that even in a "no-fault
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world", I would see no objection to, for example, unions pur-
chasing group accident insurance, the effect of which might put
employees in a better position financially while injured than while
working.
Thelaw of damages relating to personal injury is, of necessity,
in a thoroughly unsatisfactory state. All too often one is forced at
the present time not to choose the "best solution" (because it is
unavailable) but rather the "least bad" alternative.
Occasionally, I have differed from Mr. Luntz in my choice
of the "least bad" solution but this is not to deny that he has
written a book of the first-rank . I am certain that it will come to
be so regarded, both by academics and by the legal profession
throughout the Commonwealth .
R. A. HASSON*
Cases and Materials on Criminal Law and Procedure. Fourth
Edition. Edited by M. L. FRIEDLAND . Toronto: University
of Toronto Press. 1974 . Pp. xv, 1021 . ($25.00)
The first thing one notices about the new edition of Professor
Friedland's well-known casebook on criminal law and procedure'
is that there has been a vast increase in size over the last edition,
from 701 pages to 1021 pages-a not inconsiderable expansion
for a set of materials which, unlike its major competitor,' purports
to deal only with the general principles of criminal law and does
not contain chapters on the better known substantive offences
such as murder, assaults, theft and fraud. This said, however, the
increase in coverage has been very well used indeed so that this
volume, which sells at a special student price, is almost certainly
the best casebook in the field available to Canadian law teachers .
Indeed, the great improvements over the third edition come as
something of a surprise on account of the very modest preface
to this new edition which tends to place emphasis on the fact
that the basic structure has remained the same. While this is true,
the expansions and additions are such that this work now stands
on its own as a very complete treatment of the subject area and
the usual law teacher's desire to supplement with further personal
* R. A . Hasson, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
1D. A . Schmeiser, Criminal Law : Cases and Comments (2nd ed.,
1973) .
